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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
of plaintiffs, was not by name a party to the suit. There has been
no authoritative construction of this statute, but I think the term
"not a party to the action" extends only to parties named in the
proccedings, and not to a party in interest whose name does not
appear. The objection at least should have been made before
judgment was entered.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
COURT OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE.
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SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
3
SUPREMiE COURT OF WISCONSIN.4
ADMIRALTY.
laritime Lien-Remetes in rcn and in personam.-WVherever a
maritime lien arises the .ibellant or plaintiff may waive the lien in the
admiralty, and pursue his remedy by a suit in personam, or he may in-
stitute an action at law, if the common law is competent to give him
a remedy. Such a party may, if he sees fit, proceed in rem in the ad-
iniralty, and if lie elects to cnforce the maritime lien which arises in the
case, lie cannot proceed in any other mode or forum, as the jurisdiction
of the admiralty courts to enflorce a maritnme lien is exclusive and can-
not be exercised in) any other mode than by a proceeding in ren : Nor-
ton v. Switzer, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
AGENT. See Corporation.
Rati fieation-Telgraph Company!, is Agent of Sender.-Where a per-
son assunmes in good faith, but without authority in fact, to act as agent
for another, the latter on being fully informed of the act, must disaffirm
it within a reasonable time (at least where his silence would prejudice
innocent parties), or le will be held to have ratified it: avclan(d v.
Green, 40 Wis.
Thus, where plaintiff received from B., a vessel broker in defendant's
place of residence, an order to charter at certain rates a vessel belonging
to defendant, and did charter the vessel accordingly, and telegraphed
the fiaet to B., who communicated it to defendant, and the latter did not
disaffirm the contract either to B. or to plaintiff, the jury might find
that he had ratified it: 11.
The party who sends an order by telegraph makes the telegraph com-
pany his agent for its transmission and delivery, and is bound by the
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law R6Igister, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1876. The cases will probably be reported in 3 or 4 Otto.
2 From Hon. D. M. Bates, Reporter; to appear in 2 Delaware Chan. Reports.
3 From I'. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 80 Penna. St. Reports.
4 From Ilon. 0. T%. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 40 Wisconsin Reports.
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message as delivered; and where legal rights of the receiver, founded
upon such order, are in question. he is entitled to put in evidence the
message actually received, as the original: Id.
Defendant employed C. to charter his ves.sel to carry wheat from
Milwaukee to Bufllo, on condition that a cargo of coal for Milwaukee
could be procured for her at Buffalo. C. employed B., a vcssel broker
at Buffalo, to aid him, and the latter telegraphed to plaintiff at Milwau-
kee, to charter the vessel to carry wheat at the specified rate, without
condition. Held, that B. became defendant's lawful agent to charter
the vessel, and his order to plaintiff, being within the general scope of
his authority as such agent, was binding on defendant: Id.
If defendant, with knowledge of B.'s telegram to plaintiff, ratified the
plaintiff's act, he must also be held to have ratified B.'s act in sending
such order, and he thereby became bound by the order as delivered:
Id.
Liability qf Principal of Public Agent.-Although a private agent,
acting in violation of specific instructions, yet within the scope of his
general authority, may bind his principal, the rule as to the effect of the
like act of a public agent is otherwise, for the reason that it is better
that an individual should occasionally suffer from the mistakes ,f public
officers or agents than to adopt a rule which through improper combi-
nations or collusion might be turned to the detriment or injury of the
public: Whiteside et al. v. The Utited States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Teim
1876.
Individuals as well as courts must take notice of the extent of author-
ity conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity, and the
rule applies in such case that ignorance of the law furnishes no excuse
for any mistake or wrongful act: .7d.
Torts committed by an officer in the service of the United States do
not render the government liable in an implied assumpsit even though
the acts done were apparently for the public benefit: Id.
BAILMENT.
Rights of second Pledgee.-In the case of a strict pledge, if the pledgee
transfers the same to his own creditor, the latter may hold the pledge
until the debt of the original owner is discharged: Taltl v. Freedman's
S. & T. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
A tender to the second pledgee of the amount due from the first
pledger to the first pledgee, extinguishes ipso facto the title of the second
pledgee, but there can be no recovery against him without tender of
payment: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Right of Creditor to prosecute pending Action to Judgment. -Actions
pending in favor of a creditor, at the time the debtor is adjudged bank-
rupt under the present Bankrupt Act, if no objection is made by the
assignee or the Bankrupt Court. may. due notice being first given to the
assignee, be prosecuted to final judgment to ascertain the amount due
to the creditor, but the judgment recovered will be effectual and opera-
tive only, to establish the validity and amount of the claim: Norton v.
Switzer, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
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BILLS AND NOTES.
In dorser- Credlts to lbak'r- Co,1oration- Transfer of Stock by
Stockhoider who is ieuted to the C'oroation- IWtness.-A bank,
being the holder of a promissory note protested for non-payment, has not
the right to credit it with deposits made by the debtor to his account
as a justice of the peace; and its omission to do so does not discharge
the indorzer: McDowell v. Bank of Wilmtington, and Brandywine, 2
Del. Ch.
An agreement by the bank to credit the note with such fees as the
debtor might earn as a notary public in protesting bii!s and notes for the
bank does not discharge the indorser, though made without his privity:
id.
An agreement between the creditor and the principal debtor, in order
to discharge the surety, must be such as gives time to the debtor; and
it must be for a consideration : Id.
Under articles of assoeiation which had been adopted as part of the
charter of the bank it was provided that so long as a stockholder might
remain indebted to the bank his stock should not be transferable. Held,
that the defendant was not liable in damages for refusing to permit the
indorser. while still remaining liable on his indorsement, to transfer his
stock on the books of the bank : .d.
The maker of a promissory note, after a judgment recovered against
the indorser, not a competent witness for the indorser in a suit in equity
to restrain the collection of the judgment: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Liability-Special Contract -The duty of a common carrier is to
transport and deliver safely. He is made by law an insurer against all
failure to perform this duty, except such failure as may be caused by
the public enemy or by what is denominated the act of God. By spe-
cial contract with his employers, he may, it is true, to some extent, be
excused, if the limitations to his responsibility stipulated for are, in the
judgment of the law, reasonable, not inconsistent with sound public
policy. He cannot, however, by any contract with his customers relieve
himself from responsibility for his own negligence or that of his servants,
and this because such a contract is unreasonable and contrary to legal
policy: Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co.; Planters' National
Bank v. Same, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Nor can a common carrier, by a contract made with those who intrust
property to him for carriage and delivery, secure to himself exemption
from responsibility fbr consequences of the negligence of a railroad com-
pany or its agents not owned or controlled by him, but which be employs
in the transportation : I.
Control of the condnet of an agency is not in all eases essential to
liability for the consequences of that conduct: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Foreign Insurance Co.-License by the State- Condition not to re-
move Saits to I''deral Corts-Action aganst State Officer-fhow far
a 1)roceedlig against the State itself-Save by the voluntary license of
the state, a foreign insurance company has no right to carry on its busi-
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ness within this state ; and the state has power to make such license
subject to tie company's forbearance ofa right, and revocable upon the
exercise of such right: State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis.
Those provisions of the statutes (ch. 56 of 1870 and cl. 64 of 1872)
which authorize the issue of licenses to foreign insurance companies only
upon condition of their filing a written agreement not to remove to the
federal courts causes commenced against them in the courts of this state,
and require the secretary of state to revoke such licenses upon a viola-
tion of that agreement, are valid. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, dis-
tinguished, and certain obiter dicta therein criticised : _d.
So much of the statute as requires such agreement as a condition of
license being designed as a compensation fbr the provisions authorizing
licenses, if the former were held invalid, the latter would thll with it; the
secretary of state in issuing the license here in question would have acted
without authority; and the court would compel him to revoke it: .d.
Where a suit is prosecuted in a federal court by a private party against
a state officer who has no personal interest or liability in the action, but
is sued in his official vapacity only, to affect a right of the state only,
the state is the real defendant, within the prohibition of the 11th amend.
ment of the Federal Constitution : ]d.
A circuit court of the United States has therefore no jurisdiction of a
suit by a foreign corporation to restrain a state officer from revoking (as
required by the law of the state) a license granted the plaintiff corpo-
ration to do business in the state : Id.
Even if the federal court had authority to bind the (;ffieer in such a
case it could not bind the state in the exercise of its authority : Id.
A valid injunction restraining a state officer from revoking a license
previously issued by state authority would be spent with the life of such
license, and would not apply to a new license subsequently issued under
color of the same authority : Id.
onformity of Laws to requirements of the Const itutlon-Estoppel-
When a contest arises as to whether an act of the legislature has been
constitutionally passed the journal of either house may be appealed to
to settle it: Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1876.
Laws, however, certified by the secretary of state and published by
the authority of' the state must be received as having passed the legis-
lature in the manner required by the constitution, unless the contrary
clearly appears: Id.
A municipal corporation that has issued its bonds and put them on
the market as commercial paper upon the faith of a law authorizing
them to do so, cannot be permitted to show, as against a bona fide holder
of the bonds that the law has never in fact been passed. BRADLEY,
MILLER, DAVIS and FIELD. JJ., dissenting on the ground that the Su-
preme Court of the state (Illinois) having decided the supposed statute
not to be a valid law, the United States courts were bound to conform
to that decision, and a public law could not exist merely by estoppel as
between parties : Id.
CONTRACT.
(onsideration, suifciency of.-Any damage or suspension of a right,
or possibility of a loss occasioned to the plaintiff by the promise of an-
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otlier, is a sufficient consideration for such promise, and will make it
LUrding ahlaough no actual benefit, accrues to the party promising : lcn-
dbrick v. Lindsfty et i., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
II. engaged with L. to indemnify the sureties furnished by him, and
on the faith of this promise L. and 2M. executed a supersedeas bond;
Hldl, that if L. and 31 suffered loss by reason of a breach of this con-
tract they were entitled to maintain a suit against I. : Id.
CMRPORATION. See Bills and .Notes; Equity.
Acts of Agents in excess of Authority-Estol)pel-Acts vltra vires-
Waiver of .Formalities.-An act by one not sua juris, which amounts
only to a recognition of a liability already imposed, will be sustained:
Rector, &c.. of-the Church of St. Bartholomew, v. WoIod, 80 Penna. St.
Although no fresh contract liability may be created, and any waiver
of a party's right in original process may be absolutely prohibited, yet
any step may be taken to facilitate the execution of mesize process to
which a final judgment has declared the party to be subject: Id.
The charter of a church prohibited the corporation from disposing or
encumbering their real estate without the assent of the convention or
standing committee of the Episcopal Church of Pennsylvania; judg-
menit was recovered against the corporation. fleld, that if duly author-
ized. le foal rmalities in the execution might be waived: Rd.
The acknowledgmnent oif a sheriff's deed rai.es the presumption that
the statutory requisites fbr notice to the parties have been complied
with and the presumption must prevail until rebutted by satisfactory
proof: d.
Judgment was recovered against a church, inquisition and condem-
nation were waived, the waiver being signed by officers of the church
with the corporate seal, without authority; the real estate was sold under
the fi. fa. ; the purchaser afterwards conveyed to Wood, who had no
knowledge of the defects in the waiver, and the rector and officers of
the church had notice of the sheriff's sale before the conveyance to
Wood. The church e,ntinued in possession after the sheriff's sale, the
rector delivered the key to Wood after his purchase and obtained his
permission to occupy it for one Sunday and then delivered possession.
Wood expended large sums of money in repairing the building. Held,
that notwithstanding the invalidity of the waiver, the corporation was
estopped from recovering the property from Wood : It.
Foreign.-The courts of Pennsylvania are bound by the decisions of
the courts of a sister state in relation to the organization of a corporation
under the statutes of that state: Grant v. .Jenry Clay Coal o., 80
Penna. St.
A corporation of a sister state owning mining leases in Pennsylvania
sold coal to the dcfendants in this state, through an agent here, known
to them to be such agent: Held, in a suit by the corporation for the
price of the coal, the defendants bould not raise the question of the
plaintiff's right to hold such leases : Md.
The inquiry into such right could be made only by the Common-
wealth: M.
Subiscriptions to Stock before (Iharter.-A subscription to the stock
of a public corporation prior to the procurement of its charter is absolute
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and a condition attached is -void : Cabh v. Philadelphia. and Chester
County Railroad Co., 80 Penna. St.
Commissioners to receive subscriptions are not the agents of the cor-
poration but of the public, under limited and definite powers which every
subscriber is bound to know : Id.
After a corporation is organized it may receive subscriptions for stock
on conditions which it is bound to perlbrm : Id.
After organization, one subscribing without condition cannot set up
an unlawful act of the directors to avoid his subscription : Id.
Whenever a power which the subscriber cannot control, intervenes to
alter a material point in his contract without his assent, it works his
release : Id.
A subscription paper set out the termini of a railroad and the route
over which it would be constructed. 1eld, that this was an agreement
that the termini and the route should be as stated; and if the company
materially changed them, a subscriber would be released: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Errors and Appeals.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Setting aside Conveyance for Fraud- What priorities Equity recog-
vises.-The oldest judgment creditor at law, having obtained a decree
in equity setting aside a fraudulent conveyance to the debtor's children
of land purchased by him prior to the recovery of the judgment, is not
entitled to a preference in equity in the distribution of the proceeds
of the land sold under a decree. In such case the equitable doctrine
of distributing assets among creditors pari asvt applies : ewell v.
Morgan, 2 Del. Ch.
Equity will recognise and give effect to a judicial preference at law
by judgment or execution ; but such judicial preference arises, not out
of the speed of the parties in pressing their clains at law, but out of
their having obtained a prior legal lien upon the property in contro-
versy : Id.
EQUITY. See Debtor and Creditor; Jfiiniclal Corporation.
Remedy at Law.-It is no ground for relief in equity that the debtor
in a judgment is deceased and that there is no personal representative
of his estate. The creditor has sufficient remedy at law by raising an ad-
ministration: Cocran v. Cochran et al, 2 Del. Ch.
Corporation-Issue of new Stock-Remedy at Law.-Where the board
of directors of a corporation, in issuing new stock to the shareholders
generally, refuse to issue to a particular stockholder his due proportion
thereof, he may compel its issue to him by suit in equity against the
corporation (at least as long as there is sufficient stock remaining undis-
posed of); though he might probably have maintained an action at law
against it for damages: Dousman v. lhis. & Lake Sup. . & S. Co., 40
Wis.
If there are other shareholders in like condition with the plaintiff in
such a case, their right and his are several, and lie has no right to rep-
resent them: 1d.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Criminal case-Escape of Prisoner.-It is clearly within the discretion
of the court to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the con-
victed party suing out the writ is where he can be made to respond to
any judgment the court may render: Smith v. United States, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1876.
S persedeas-Requisites of.-In the Supreme Court of the United
States the service of a writ of error, or the perfection of an appeal within
sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the rendering of thejudgment or the
passing of the decree complained of, is an indispensable pre-requisite to
a supersedeas, and it is not within the power of a justice or judge of the
appellate court to grant a stay of process on the judgment if this has
not been done: Kitchea v. Randolph, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Surety-Sufficiency of-Change of Circumnstances.-On suing out a
writ of error, if after the security has been accepted, the circumstances
of the case, or of the parties, or of the sureties upon the bond, have
changed, so that security which, at the time it was taken, was good and
sufficient does not continue to be so, the court may upon a proper appli-
cation, so adjudge and order as justice may require. But upon facts
existing at the time the security was accepted, the action of the justice,
within the statute and rules of practice adopted for his guidance, is
final: Martint v. Hazard Powder Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
ESTOPPEL. See Constitutional Lazo ; Cotporation.
EVIDENCE.
Foreign Statutes-Act of Congres.-The copy of a statute of another
state certified by the secretary of state under its seal is properly certified
according to the Act of Congress of May 26th 1790, and is admissible
in evidence: Grant v. Renry Clay Coal Company, 80 Penna. St.
One chapter of General Statutes of Massachusetts duly certified re-
ferred to another statute: Held, that it was admissible in evidence with-
out including in the certificate the act referred to : Id.
To make an act containing different subjects admissible in evidence, it
is not necessary the whole act should be certified ; it is sufficient to pro-
duce those sections relating to the subject-matter: Id.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Corporation.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Decree in. Emt'.-A final decree, entered upon the record and signed
by the Chancellor, dismissing the bill, and not directed to be without
prejudice, is a bar to another bill filed between the same parties for the
same subject-matter: Cochran v. Cotper, Adm., 2 Del. Ch.
The complainant, a married woman, had filed a previous bill in equity
for arrearages of an annuity, claiming to recover suijuris on the ground
of a divorce. The bill was dismissed for want of proof of the divorce.
Hel that the decree, not being without prejudice, was a bar to the pres-
ent bill filed against the same defendant for the same subject-matter: Rld.
GOVERNMENT. See Agent.
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HIGHWAY. See Nuisance.
Bozntlary by Plai or Plat- Title of Adjoining Owner-Dedica-
tion to P'ablic Ue.-The recorded plat of a block showed upon the cast
side lots 115 feet deep. with anl alley 10 feet wide in the rear, and on
the west side lots 97 feet deep with a space in the rear 20 feet wide,
adjoining said alley, entitled " Darling Place." The certificate indorsed
on the plat stated that the signers thereot, owners in severalty of the
lands embraced" in said block, had caused it to be "subdivided into
lots, with a court or place and an alley as shown" thereon ; and that
" the alley in the rear of the front [eastern] lots, is for the accommodation
of said lots, and the court shown as ' Darling Place' is given as a public
promenade for foot people, but not to be opened for teams or cattle."
Held, that both the alley and "Darling Place" became, by the recording
of such plat, public highways, though with certain restrictions : Petti-
bone and Others v. Hamilton, 40 Wis.
It is settled doctrine in this state, that in the absence of anything
in his deed to show a contrary intention, the grantee of a lot in a re-
corded plat takes to the centre of adjoining public ways, subject to the
public easement; and this result is not affected by the fact that the
description in the deed as well as the plat gives the dimensions of the
lot as it is exclusive of the highway : Rd.
This doctrine applies in favor of one who took a deed by metes and
bounds only, of land which afterwards constituted a distinct lot upon a
plat subsequently made and recorded by his grantor : I .
After conveying to plaintiffs all the lots on the east side of said block,
and to defendants the whole tract on the west side abutting upon "Dar-
ling Place," the proprietors had no further interest in said " place" or
said alley ; and their deed to defendants of all their interest and title
in and to said place and alley does not affect the rights of their respective
grantees : Rd.
While the recorded plat, and the conveyance of lands with reference
to.it, constitute, as against the proprietors, a valid dedication to the pub-
lie use of the land marked as public ways, without any formal accept-
ance by the public, the question whether such acceptance is necessary
to render the municipality liable to damages resulting from want of
repair of such ways, is not here decided : .14.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Alimony -On the husband's appeal from a judgment of divorce in
favor of the wife (which appears to have given all the appellant's pro-
perty to the respondent by way of alimony), it appearing that the re-
spondent had married again before the time for appeal from the judg-
ment had expired, and that her second husband was still living, this
court denied her motion for an order on the appellant to pay her a sum
sufficient to enable her to litigate the appeal: Cood v. Coad, 40 Wis.
JOINT ACTION. See Equity; _iidsance.
MUNIcIPAL CORPORATION. See MIighiay.
Improvement of hligh ws-Assessinen ts on adjoiningOwners-Enity.
-It is the settled law of this state, under the provisions of' its constitu-
tion, that the legislature may authorize municipal corporations to levy
special assessments upon the adjoining lots for the improvement of high-
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ways within the muni'ipality ; and this rule aiplies to highways by
water a well as to those by land : Johnson v. C;/wqnkec, 40 \is.
Under the charter of Milwaukee as amended by ch. 401 of 1870,
abutting property could be required to bear the cost of highway im-
proveinents only to the extent to which it was actually benefited, which
was to be estimated upon actual view by the commi-sioners of public
works ; and where it appears that an apparent estimate of benefits, in
such a case, rested absolutely on the estimated cost of the improvement,
and not upon an actual consideration or estimate of actual benefits, the
assessment must be held invalid : d.
Where such an assessment is invalid, equity will restrain the issue of
the certificate to the contractor, as a threatened cloud upon the title,
and will not delay interference until the lot is advertised for sale: Id.
NUISANCE.
Ol,slruction of IIighway -Rights of Private Owners-Joint action
ay -It. is settled law of this state, that an obstruction which prevents a
lawful use of a public highway, besides being a public nuisance, is a
special injury to adjoining lot-owners, entitling them to an injunction
against such obstruction : 1ettihow. v. Tamilton, 40 Wis.
An averment by such lot-owners that such obstruction will greatly
diminish the value of their said lots and buildings, and will greatly
increase the liability of said buildings to fire, and will otherwise greatly
injure their said property, is a sufficient allegation of special injury: Vd.
The fijet that plaintiffs own severally, and not jointly, the lots and
buildings specially injured by the obstruction, will not prevent their
joining in an action to restrain it: 11.
PARTNERSHIP.
Firm and Indbidual Debts-Marshalling of Assets.-A debtor, being
a member of an insolvent partnership, conveyed his separate real estate
in satis ihction of" a debt due to a separate creditor. The real estate ex-
ceeded in value, to a considerable amount, the debt for the satisfaction
of which it was conveyed. Ifeld, that the other creditors had an interest
in the excess, and that in equity'tlc property conveyed would be held
as a security, first for the debt due to the grantee, and. as to the excess
of value, for other debts: Bailry v. Kcnncdy et al., 2 Del. Ch,
The real estate conveyed being the separate property of the co-partner
the excess of value was bound, first, for his separate debts, and only after
satisfying these was it applicable to the debts of the partnership : Id.
PUBLIC OFFICER. See Agent.
RAILROAD.
Neylence-Adjacent Lands or Building,s -Where there is no direct
proof that. a building near a railroad is set on fire by sparks from a loco-
motive, whether it was so set on fire depends on circumstances, and there-
lore is for the jury : . & R. Railroad co. v. Iendrickson, 80 Penna. St.
Where a arn quite near the track of a railroad was negligently burned
by sparks f'nm a locomotive. lipi. not evidence of contributory negli-
gence that tim owner suffered the roof to be in sueli coidition as that it
was moc lible t, take fire than if It had a secure and safl roof: d.
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The owner of property near a railroad must take all risks of a proper
and careful use of the road, and when a railroad company uses the most
approved spark ari'esters, and proper care and vigilance in running its
engines, an adjacent landowner has no remedy for injury to his property
by fire thrown from a locomotive. But where actual negligence in run-
ning an engine is proved, and loss results, the mere condition of the
landholder's property is no defence : _7d.
In order to hold a landholder for contributory negligence where injury
is done to his property by fire from an engine on a railroad, lie must have
done some act or omitted some duty which is the proximate cause of the
injury concurring with the negligence of the railroad company : Id.
Farmers may cultivate and use their farms and improvements as is
customary amongst farmers, and are not bound to exercise unusual
means to guard against the negligence of railroad companies : 1i1.
RE310 AL O' CAUSES. See Constitutional Law.
STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
Statutory Garant-Legislatihe Intent.-A grant of land may be made
by a law, as well as a patent pursuant to a law : Ryian et al. v. Garter et
al., S. C. G. S., Oct. Term 1876.
There is no known rule of law requiring the court to interpret the
proviso of a statute according to the literal import of the words employed
when the evident intention of the legislature is different: .d.
TAXATION.
Restraints upon.-The taxing power is vital to the functions of go-
vernment. It may be restrained by contract in special cases for the
public good, where such contracts are not forbidden. But the contract
must be shown to exist. There is no presumption in its favor. It is in
derogation of public right, and narrows a trust created for the good of
all: West Wisconsin Railway Co. v. Board of Spervisors of Trempea-
.leau County, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
TELEGRAPH. See Agent.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Cy pres Doctrine-Devise void for Uncertainty.-In defining and
enforcing trusts, the courts of this state have only a strictly judicial
power, and have not succeeded to the jurisdiction over charities exer-
cised by the English chancellor by virtue of the royal prerogative,
under the doctrine of cypres : .Heiss, Executor, &c., v. Murphey and
Others, 40 Wis.
A devise and bequest of real and personal property "to the Roman
Catholic orphans" of a certain diocese in this state, with a further pro-
vision in the will appointing plaintiff, the Roman Catholic bishop of
said diocese, executor and giving him I- power to sell the above property
and use the proceeds for the benefit of the Roman Catholic orphans,"
held void for uncertainty in the description of the beneficiaries; the
class not being sufficiently defined, and no way being provided for select-
ing the individual beneficiaries from any class ; and this uncertainty is
fatal, whether the design was to pass the legal title to the beneficiaries,
or to the executor in trust for them. or to confer upon the executor a
power of sale, &c., in their behalf: Id.
